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Abstract 
As illustrated by the recent adoption of the European Union Baltic Sea Strategy, a new level 
of governance seems to be emerging in the European integration process, i.e. the macro-
regional level. The present paper aims at identifying the necessary ingredients for successful 
macro-regional cooperation. It draws on the example of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), where 
the combination of intense cooperation and of  heterogeneity is particularly interesting to 
analyze. The author argues that effective macro-regional cooperation requires four factors: a 
common perception of interests, a common identity, a well-balanced cooperation method, and 
the involvement of the EU. The respective relevance of each of these factors is tested and 
















The paper is based on the Master’s Thesis Towards a Europe of the Macro-Regions? Success 
factors and benefits of macro-regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, College of 
Europe, Department of European Political and Administrative Studies Bruges, 2009, available 
in the institution’s library. Please consult this document for an elaboration of the analysis 
below. 4 
 
On 10 June 2009, the European Commission issued its proposal for the first macro-
regional strategy of the EU’s history, i.e. the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region
1. This 
comprehensive strategy, covering several Community policies and targeted on a macro-
region, was endorsed by the European Council in October 2009
2. A few months earlier, in 
June 2009, Heads of State and Government invited the Commission to present an EU Strategy 
for the Danube region before the end of 2010
3. These developments point to the emergence of 
a new level of governance in the European integration process: the macro-regional level
4, i.e. 
an intermediary level between the national and the European one. Given the increasing 
heterogeneity within the EU due to the successive enlargements over the last years, such an 
empowerment of macro-regions might be an innovative and effective way to bring the 
European integration process forward. Macro-regions can offer a higher problem-solving 
capacity than the EU-27 in a number of fields such as innovation policy, environmental 
protection, etc, as it might be easier to achieve common understanding and mutual trust at this 
level.
5 As expressed by a Swedish CEO, “in the Baltic region we are similar enough to 
cooperate and different enough to learn from each other”.
6
Nevertheless, the mere adoption of an official strategy will not be sufficient to achieve 
the ambitious goals set by European policy-makers. Indeed, macro-regional cooperation is 
confronted with the same overarching challenge as the one faced by the EU as a whole, i.e. 
how to ensure that countries having various interests, traditions and needs work effectively 
 
                                                             
1 According to the EU Baltic Sea Strategy, the Baltic Sea Region consists of the eight EU Member States 
bordering the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden. The State of 
the Region Report adopts a broader definition by including Iceland, Norway and Russia’s Northwestern Region.  
2 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 29/30 October 2009, p.11 
3 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 18/19 June 2009, p.13 
4 According to Joseph Nye, a macro-region can be defined as “a limited number of states linked together by a 
geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence” (http://ocw.unu.edu/programme-for-
comparative-regional-integration-studies/introducing-regional-integration/a-typology-of-regions/  -  02.05.09) 
There is no specific definition of macro-regions in the EU. 
5 For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter 2 of the Master’s Thesis Towards a Europe of the Macro-
Regions ? Success factors and benefits of macro-regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. It is 
demonstrated through a case study that the macro-regional level does present an added value compared to the 
national and European ones. 
6 Hans Dalborg, Chairman of Nordea, www.bdforum.org (03.03.09) 5 
 
together towards common goals. Whereas one can find an incredible number of studies on EU 
policy-making, macro-regional cooperation has not attracted much attention from scholars so 
far. The aim of this paper is to identify the necessary ingredients for a successful macro-
regional cooperation to happen and to assess their respective relevance. It will be argued that 
four factors are required: a common perception of interests, a common identity, a well-
balanced cooperation method and the involvement of the EU. Their selection deserves further 
examination. 
The first factor, common perception of interests, reflects the assumption that the 
objective existence of benefits is not sufficient to explain the development of the cooperation. 
There are many areas in the world where cooperation would be economically beneficial but 
which does not take place for non-economic reasons. It illustrates the fact that interests need 
to be subjectively commonly perceived by policy-makers. In this respect, interests probably 
need to be understood in a broader sense and should include political motivations as well. 
The criterion of common identity is probably the most surprising and original one. 
One could intuitively argue that interests will be the exclusive driving force of such a 
functional process. Nevertheless, a certain sense of common belonging might be necessary for 
the long-term viability of cooperation: in the case of changing or too many competing 
interests, this could facilitate the pursuit of cooperation. In addition, branding is increasingly 
necessary in the context of an expanding area of competition and it has probably to be 
underpinned by a certain level of common identity. Hence the exact role of identity deserves 
further examination. 
The factor of cooperation method reflects the balance between two elements, i.e. the 
institutional framework and the involvement  of stakeholders. The former  reflects the 
assumption that institutions do matter. A number of (neo-)institutionalist theories were 6 
 
developed to explain the European integration process, which, according to Mark Pollack, “is 
without question the most densely institutionalized international organization in the world”
7
In order to assess the respective relevance of each of these factors, this paper will draw 
on the example of the Baltic Sea Region. With the 1995 and 2004 EU-enlargements the Baltic 
Sea has become the inland sea of the EU, with almost one third of the EU’s member states on 
its shores.
. 
This institutionalist postulate has to be tested in order to assess whether it is relevant or not for 
macro-regional cooperation. The latter element emerges from the observation that a lot of 
territorial cooperation projects – even on a small territorial scale such as cross-border projects 
– still lack effectiveness and dynamism due to the poor involvement of stakeholders. This 
assumption has to be verified in the case of bigger transnational projects.  
Finally, the factor of EU involvement reflects the interrogation as to whether the EU 
has any role to play with regard to macro-regional cooperation. The underlying issue is how 
the macro-regional and the EU-wide levels can be articulated in a meaningful way from a 
subsidiarity perspective, with a clear and effective division of responsibilities. 
8 Over the years cooperation within the BSR has increased both in scope and in 
degree
9: it takes place in an increasing number of policy fields and involves ever more 
ambitious projects. Given this high level of interaction, the BSR is today commonly 
considered as being “one of the most regionalized parts of Europe”
10 and as “a showcase 
laboratory”
11
                                                             
7 Rosamond, Ben, “New Theories of European Integration”, in: M. Cini (ed.), European Union Politics, Oxford, 
2007, p.123  
8 Antola, Esko, “Third Wave Cooperation Needed in the Baltic Sea Region”, B.R.E., 22.6.06, p.8 
9 Svedberg, Marcus, “The Baltic Rim Model”, B.R.E., 28.2.06, p.8 
10 Joenniemi, Pertti, “Bridging the Iron Curtain? Cooperation around the Baltic Rim”, Copenhagen Peace 
Research Institute, August 1999, p.2 
11 European Parliament, “Europe’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region”, “Baltic Europe” Intergroup, 2005, p.6 
 for the European integration process. On the other hand, there remains a high 
level of economic and political heterogeneity within the Region due to the longstanding 7 
 
division between the Eastern and the Western shores of the Baltic Rim. This combination of 
intense cooperation and heterogeneity makes the BSR particularly interesting to explore.  
The paper will first analyze what kind of interests have played a role in the BSR 
cooperation process since the end of the Cold War, and how important the perception by 
policy-makers of these sometimes diverging interests has been (1). It will then explore to what 
extent identity has provided a drive to this process and will discuss the need for a stronger 
common identity in the BSR (2). Moreover, it will investigate the BSR cooperation method 
by assessing both its institutional framework and its bottom-up forces (3). Finally, it will 
assess the extent to which the EU has played a catalyst role in a concrete macro-regional 
cooperation project (4). 
 
1.  A common perception of interests 
This first section will resort to a historical perspective in order to show with various examples 
taken from the post-Cold War period that the existence of different interests in the BSR has 
sometimes hampered the cooperation (1.1). It will then demonstrate that a common perception 
of interests is ultimately of a political nature and has thus to be accompanied by political will 
and leadership (1.2).  
1.1.   The historical difficulty of agreeing on common priorities 
For most of the 1990s cooperation in the BSR was dominated by political motives, 
while economic issues were certainly important but not at the forefront of the public 
discourse.
12
                                                             
12 B.D.F., State of the Region Report 2007, ‘The Baltic Sea Region as a place to do business’, p.10 
 This was very much due to the influence of an exogenous factor, i.e. the end of 
the Cold War. Just after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the symbol of reintegrating into the 8 
 
‘European house’ rise to political visions like recreating a ‘Mare Balticum’ in countries which 
had been for half a century under totalitarian domination. The prevalence of (geo)political 
interests till the mid-1990s was illustrated by the fact that the agenda of the Council of Baltic 
Sea  States was dominated by issues inherited from the Soviet legacy and related to the 
transition
13
Gradually, over the 1990s, a gap has emerged between the Eastern and the Western 
shores of the Baltic Rim, both having different priorities and interests regarding the agenda of 
the Baltic Sea cooperation. On the one hand, the Nordic countries and Germany were 
increasingly interested in economic and environmental issues rather than in the traditional 
agenda of security
, in particular to the traditional security issues.  
14
This has changed under the influence of an exogenous factor, i.e. the EU- and NATO-
enlargements in 2004. From the moment the Baltic States and Poland joined both 
organizations, there has been a downgrading of the old agenda of security.
. As far as the economic issues were concerned, this could be explained 
by the fact that they had just experienced a severe economic crisis and were afraid of being 
further marginalized in the context of a fierce global competition. On the other hand, the 
Baltic States and Poland were still greatly preoccupied by traditional security concerns and 
perceived them as the main priority. Here again, this is quite comprehensible: for instance, the 
Russian troops stayed in the Baltic States till 1994 and the bilateral relations remained very 
tense afterwards especially due to the presence of large Russian minorities in Estonia and 
Latvia. As a result, till the beginning of the 2000s there was a different perception of common 
interests across the Region which hampered the cooperation.  
15
                                                             
13 Joenniemi, op.cit., p.5 
14 Ibid., p.6 
15Ibid., p.7 
 This has been 
accompanied by a period of doubt concerning the raison d’être of the Baltic Sea cooperation. 
There was a growing fear that BSR countries may lose interest in cooperating at the macro-9 
 
regional level and may shift their entire attention towards the EU-level. All this has led to a 
shift in the perception of common interests from a focus on political to functional issues, with 
economic development and environmental protection becoming prevalent goals.
16 A very 
pragmatic approach is now taken: “Cross-national cooperation is not a goal in itself – it is a 
tool to achieve other, more ultimate goals like economic prosperity or security.”
17
However, even though there is a broadly shared perception of common interests in the 
BSR, individual countries’ interests are still very much present and are sometimes diverging. 
A prominent example was shown by the “Viking Line”  and  “Laval un partneri”  cases 
opposing respectively Finish and Estonian and Swedish and Latvian socio-economic interests. 
Beyond these highly symbolic and politicized issues, the common perception of interests is 
also not completely straightforward in the day-to-day cooperation: “One has always to make 
sure that everybody has the same objectives and, most importantly, that it’s a win-win 
situation, that it’s not beneficial for some countries more than for others.”
 Since the 
mid-2000s the competitiveness of BSR countries together with the Lisbon Strategy have been 
presented in the public discourse as a matter of common interest and a major goal.  
18
In addition, there remain some differences in terms of objectives’ prioritization. It is 
best illustrated by the titles of the ‘non-papers’ that were recently drafted to provide an input 
to the European Commission regarding the EU BSR Strategy. Whereas the Finish ‘non-paper’ 
is entitled “A clean Baltic Sea and a prosperous economic area”, the Polish one is called 
“Cohesion and competitiveness of the Baltic Sea Region”.
 
19
                                                             
16 State of the Region Report 2007, op.cit., p.10 
17 Ibid. 
18 Interview with Emily Wise, Research Fellow, Research Policy Institute, Lund University – 17.02.09 (phone 
interview) 
19 Brask, Hans, “Visions for the Future BSR Cooperation – An EU Avant-Garde in Promoting the Fifth Freedom 
of the Internal Market?”, B.R.E., 17.6.08, p.34 
 The Nordic countries place 10 
 
economic issues on equal footing with environmental ones, whereas the Baltic States and 
Poland put a lot more emphasis on socio-economic problems.  
1.2.   The interplay between economic and political interests 
Even when economic interests dominate the discussion, the decision to cooperate or 
not ultimately remains of political nature; this is best shown by the current financial and 
economic crisis. The whole Region is hit, though to variable extents. The question arises as to 
whether the crisis will lead to an acceleration and deepening of regional cooperation or will 
on the contrary result in protectionist reactions and in a stronger focus on domestic affairs. 
From an economic viewpoint, it appears that a coordinated action would be the optimal 
solution since national responses are clearly unable to deal with this crisis alone, especially 
given the small size of most BSR countries
20. “If there is a joint endeavor to coordinate 
programmes and policies, it will be much easier to go out from the crisis, especially for 
smaller countries. They would be in a stronger position afterwards.”
21
Nevertheless, the economic rationale is clearly not a sufficient condition for macro-
regional cooperation to happen. History has shown that the burden of proof gets harder for 
regional or international cooperation in times of crisis
 
22
                                                             
20 Interview with Christian Ketels, Professor at the Harvard Business School, Institute for Strategy and 
Competitiveness – 09.02.09 (phone interview) 
21 Interview with Christopher Beazley, MEP, Chairman of the “Baltic Europe” Intergroup – 26.02.09 (phone 
interview) 
22 B.D.F., State of the Region Report 2008, “Sustaining Growth at the top of Europe”, p.9 
 because bad economic times often 
lead to an increased protectionism, not least under the pressure of public opinion. So the 
perception at the political level of common interests is a key determinant for success. 
Ultimately, it is not economists but politicians who decide in what field and with what 
intensity to carry out cooperative activities in spite of protectionist temptations.  11 
 
Against this background, the involvement of the highest political level is of crucial 
importance. According to some interviewees, political will and leadership are still insufficient 
in the BSR, and this explains why cooperation is slower and less effective than it could be:  
“We definitely need more political leadership. A lot of initiatives are discussed at the lower 
political level, but they don’t get enough attention because the highest political level is 
insufficiently involved.”
23
In recent years some countries such as Sweden have already tried to take the lead, but 
this appeared to be quite tricky as the example of the EU Baltic Sea Strategy showed: “Right 
from the start the Swedes have been the big backers and supporters of the Strategy. But they 
realized quite quickly that it wouldn’t work if it were considered as a Swedish project, 




2.  A common identity 
 
This demonstrates that reaching a political agreement on common interests and goals 
for the whole Region is crucial for a successful cooperation to happen. The paper will now 
move on to the question whether such a functional and mainly interest-driven cooperation 
process has to be underpinned by a common identity. 
 
This section successively examines the main traditional elements of identity: geography on 
the one hand (2.1) and history and culture on the other hand (2.2). It then moves on to the 
relations between identity and branding (2.3). 
                                                             
23 Interview with an official preferring to stay anonymous 
24 Interview with an official preferring to stay anonymous 12 
 
2.1.   The role played by geography 
Interestingly enough, geography appears to play in the BSR an equally important role 
with regard to identity as to interests. Firstly, as a matter of fact, (almost) all countries of the 
Region are geographically neighbours and share something in common: the Baltic Sea. The 
Region even defines itself in relation with the Baltic Sea. By creating positive externalities, 
geographic proximity also shapes interests. Nevertheless, some authors argue that the BSR 
should not be regarded as a geographical concept
25. For instance, Norway and Iceland do not 
lie in the Baltic Sea but are involved in a number of cooperation projects. This demonstrates 
that “definitions of areas are deeply embedded in history, culture and politics. They have 
always been defined in a context somehow wider than geography”
26
The analysis of two other geographical factors, i.e. the small size of the countries and 
their peripheral position, seems to be more relevant. First of all, most of the countries are 
small, apart from Germany and Poland. In economic terms, it means that these countries have 
small domestic markets and are dependent to a great extent on international trade and exports. 
In political terms, they have a limited weight and bargaining power, especially in an enlarged 
Europe. “Acting at a cross-national level gives the possibility to be more well-known, better 
branded and more attractive.”
.  
27
Secondly, the whole Region is situated at the periphery of Europe. This has resulted in 
a growing fear of being economically and politically isolated within Europe. This fear was 
further enhanced by the debate over the ‘European banana’ in the 1990s, which would extend 
 The small size of the countries clearly provides an incentive 
for cooperation. 
                                                             
25 Sutela, Pekka, “Baltic Sea Economic Space – Vision or Illusion?”, Baltic Sea Agenda, No.1, 2002, p.9 
26 Ibid. 
27 Interview with Emily Wise, op.cit. 13 
 
from Southern England to Northern Italy and would be the economic core of Europe
28. As the 
BSR countries have felt threatened by peripheralization, they have aspired for increased 
centrality
29. This ambition can be explicitly found in the Strategy published by the European 
Parliament: it recommends making the BSR “a core of Europe, not a marginal periphery as it 
was in the 20
th century”
30. This is both a matter of common interest and of identity: the very 
fact that BSR countries have perceived this common danger of marginalization from the rest 
of Europe has helped in transcending cognitive barriers
31
2.2.   The importance of common historical and cultural roots 
 and feeling more united and 
cohesive.  
Thus cooperation certainly requires some level of geographic cohesiveness. In the 
BSR, common geographical features (i.e. sharing of the Sea, small size and peripheral 
situation) have all provided a drive to cooperation though to variable extents. They have 
shaped the identity of the Region as well as its perception of common interests. Nevertheless, 
as the examples of Norway and Iceland show, geography does not always prove to be the 
main determinant. Other factors such as history and culture also play a significant role. 
For centuries the Baltic Sea has been a uniting link between these countries, a very 
high degree of exchanges of all kinds (commercial, cultural, religious, military, etc) taking 
place across its shores. For instance, the Estonian capital was founded by the Danes in 1219 
after a military battle. The name Tallinn is derived from the expression “Taani-Linn” which 
means “Danish castle/town”. Another prominent example is the Hanseatic League: this 
alliance of around 200 trading cities along the coast of Northern Europe from the Baltic to the 
                                                             
28 Williams, Leena-Karina, “The Baltic Sea Region: Forms and Functions of Regional Cooperation”, Berlin, 
2002, p.9 
29 Joenniemi, op.cit., p.8 
30 ‘Europe’s Strategy’, op.cit., p.6 
31 Joenniemi, op.cit., p.2 14 
 
North Sea served as a very active link between all these countries from the 13
th to the 17
th 
century.  
The question arises as to the relevance and the impact of this historical and cultural 
legacy on the contemporary cooperation process. For some authors this has played a crucial 
role since it has contributed to establishing and maintaining links across the Region
32
Interestingly enough, despite this caveat, common historical and cultural roots have 
been very much emphasized by policy-makers since the end of the Cold War. They have been 
used in the public discourse to provide a historical raison d’être
. This is 
best exemplified by the current existence of numerous networks and by a great deal of 
interaction among civil societies. Nevertheless, the BSR history is also characterized by a 
strong rivalry: some countries such as Sweden aspired to great power status and often tried 
militarily to dominate the Region. This is the reason why history can also be a divisive issue.  
33 for extending both the scale 
and scope of cooperation from the Nordic countries to the Baltic States and Poland. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, a plethora of catchy names were proposed in the public debate such as 
‘Baltic Europe’, ‘Mare Balticum’
34, the ‘Amber Gateway’, etc. For these reasons it is argued 
that the BSR already exists as “a cognitive region and project”
35 or as “a discursive 
product”
36 and has thereby become “self-reinforcing”
37
However, this “mainly benevolent and enthusiastic ‘region-building historicism’”
.  
38
                                                             
32 Andersson, Marcus, “Region branding: The Case of the Baltic Sea Region”, Place branding and Public 
Diplomacy, 3: 2, 2007, p.126 
33 Anderson, op.cit., p.127 
34 Joenniemi, op.cit., p.2 
35 Scott, James, “Cross-Border Governance in the Baltic Sea Region”, Regional and Federal Studies, 12;4, 2002, 
p.136 
36 Joenniemi, op.cit., p.2 
37 Williams, op.cit., p.10 
38 Ibid., p.6 
 
seems quite problematic for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it is doubtful whether policy-makers 
can justify contemporary cooperation and promote a sense of collective identity by making a 15 
 
retroactive use of history
39. Secondly, given the past rivalry mentioned above, history has to 
be used very carefully so as not to trigger old fears of domination especially among small 
countries; cooperation could otherwise be perceived as the expression of a “latent neo-
colonialism”
40. In fact, it appears difficult to strike the right balance between the emphasis on 
the common cultural heritage and the respect of national diversity. The risk is to damage the 
coherence of region-building by producing a rather unclear message such as the following 
one: “the Region must restore its identity, within the EU, in its own right while supporting the 
rich cultural diversity within the Region”
41
This might explain why the level of identification with the Region is today not equal 
to a sense of common identity, even though opinions slightly differ in that regard. For 
example, the Swedish Minister Cecilia Malmström and MEP Christopher Beazley 
respectively declared: “There is no Baltic Sea identity as such. But we feel connected. For 
instance the Nordic people showed their solidarity when the Balts demonstrated for their 
independence. There is a sense of belonging, yes, I would say, a sense of historical 
community.”
. 
42; “There has always been a Baltic Sea identity in cultural terms: there is a 
natural affinity but it’s not recognized as much as it should be.”
43
                                                             
39 Andersson, op.cit., p.127 
40 Williams, op.cit., p.6 
41 ‘Europe’s Strategy’, op.cit., p.19 
42 Cecilia Malmström, Conference at the College of Europe, ‘A Swedish Vision for Europe’, Bruges, 04.02.09 
43 Interview with Christopher Beazley, op.cit. 
. 
Given that the BSR does not have a strongly anchored common identity, the question 
arises as to whether this hampers the smooth functioning of what is mostly a functional and 
interest-driven process. 16 
 
2.3.   Identity and branding 
Some argue that “identity will not drive the process. The cross-national level will be 
recognized as a relevant level if it can deliver things that other levels cannot deliver.”
44 
Given this viewpoint one can wonder why so many efforts are still today made to foster a 
BSR identity. As an example, a ‘Balticness’ campaign was launched in 2007 by the Latvian 
CBSS presidency in order to enhance the diffusion of a shared cultural identity
45. In February 
2009 the Finish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb again stated that “new ideas and impetus 
to reinforce our regional identity are needed”
46
Even though identity does not provide the major drive for functional cooperation, it 
does have a role to play with regard to branding. Branding can be defined as “the process 
whereby a country actively seeks to create a unique and competitive identity for itself, with 
the aim of positioning the country internally and internationally”
.  
47. It is now recognized as 
being absolutely crucial in order to raise the economic profile of a place and to attract inward 
investment, highly qualified workers, tourists, etc. As MEP Christopher Beazley points out, 
“a rise in the public awareness and visibility of a region can result in an increase in inward 
investment which is much higher than any potential EU funds.”
48 Therefore, the European 
Parliament proposes to “systematically create a brand for the region as one of the most 
attractive and competitive areas in the world”
49
But the question remains to be answered whether branding needs to be underpinned by 
identity. According to place-branding theory, branding and identity are interacting and 
.  
                                                             
44 Interview with Christian Ketels, op.cit. 
45 Kalnins, Ojars, “A Baltic Sea Strategy – Acting Regionally, Thinking Globally”, B.R.E., 31.10.07, p.14 
46 Stubb, Alexander, “Baltic Sea Cooperation towards 2020 – serious challenges but bright opportunities”, 
B.R.E., 27.2.09, p.9 
47 Andersson, op.cit., p.122 
48 Interview with Christopher Beazley, op.cit. 
49 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution on a Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern 
Dimension’, 2006/2171(INI), Nov.2006, p.2 17 
 
mutually reinforcing themselves. While a sense of collective identity is required in order to 
build and maintain a brand, the development of such an identity can itself be facilitated by a 
brand-building effort.
50
  Given the insufficient level of common identity in the BSR, one could wonder whether 
some actions can be undertaken to address this problem. Branding appears to be a real 
challenge because of the diversity of the Region in terms of language, culture, etc: quite 
logically the complexity of place branding increases with the size and diversity of a place.
 This means that, even in the field of economic cooperation, a certain 
degree of common identity is required.  
51 
This was confirmed by some of the interviewees, who explained the concrete difficulties of 
common branding: “We [the city of Tallinn] participated together with Finland in the World 
Expo: we had joint stands, but no joint strategy, no joint objectives. It is an example of how to 
cooperate pragmatically, but it shows its limitations.”
52
3.  A well-balanced cooperation method 
 These obstacles are obviously more 
related to interests, but one could argue that a higher level of identification would help 
mediate competing interests.  A certain sense of common belonging thus proves to be an 
important facilitator of macro-regional cooperation. It has also to be accompanied by a well-
balanced cooperation method. 
 
By “well-balanced” the author here means the right mix between a top-down process and 
bottom-up forces. The BSR cooperation method is a sui generis one: on the one hand, it is 
based on intergovernmentalism and the strict respect of the sovereignty of nation states; on 
                                                             
50 Andersson, op.cit., p.128 
51 Ibid., p.121 
52 Interview with Jaanus Vahesalu, International Projects Manager, and Ingrid Hindrikson, Coordinator of 
Development Projects, Business Development Unit, City Enterprise Board, City of Tallinn  –  Tallinn, 22.12.08 18 
 
the other hand, it is accompanied by very dynamic bottom-up forces illustrated by the large 
involvement of civil society. One could thus argue that the BSR cooperation method is quite 
the opposite of the EU integration process. The EU is namely one of the most integrated areas 
in the world, where Member States gave up their sovereignty in such sensitive areas as 
monetary or commercial policy. Yet, there is an ongoing debate on the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’ especially given the ever lower turnout at the European Parliament’s elections. This 
section will first analyze the institutional framework (3.1) before dealing with the bottom-up 
forces at play in the BSR (3.2).  
3.1. A strongly intergovernmental institutional framework 
The Nordic cooperation has exerted a dominant influence on the wider Baltic Sea 
cooperation: it has provided an institutional model that was largely transferred to the broader 
Region in the 1990s
53. The long tradition of cooperation among the Nordic countries started 
during the Cold War with the creation in 1952 of the Nordic Council (bringing together 
parliamentarians from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). Only about 20 years 
later, in 1971, the Nordic Council of Ministers was created as a platform for governments. 
The Nordic Council of Ministers has  its own secretariat and, in addition to the political 
dialogue, it has initiated a broad range of joint activities in various policy fields.
54 However, 
cooperation has always remained at the level of low politics because Nordic countries are 
traditionally opposed to any form of integration or supranationality
55
                                                             
53 State of the Region Report 2008, op.cit., p.25 
54 Ibid. 
55 Williams, op.cit., p.7 
. These activities have 
thus taken place in a rather pragmatic and depoliticized way. This was made possible by the 
high degree of homogeneity and common understanding among these countries. Due to 
similar political and social systems as well as similar ways of life, a “geographic and societal 19 
 
sense of belonging together”
56 was prevailing. This was illustrated by the existence of dense 
social, political and economic networks within the Nordic Region where personal contacts 
were very important
57
After the end of the Cold War the Nordic model of cooperation seemed quite attractive 
to non-Nordic countries. It was based on cooperation and not on integration, thereby not 
encroaching upon the sovereignty of  participating nation states. This was particularly 
important for countries like the Baltic States and Poland that had just restored their 
independence after a long period of Soviet domination. This explains why, although the level 
of heterogeneity hugely increased, the model of Nordic cooperation was transposed to the 
BSR with the creation in 1992 of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). The founding 
members were all Nordic states, the Baltic States, Russia, Germany, Poland and the European 
Commission. Interestingly, the CBSS defines itself as “a flexible, demand-driven and result-
oriented forum for regional cooperation”
. 
58
The functioning of the CBSS is indeed strongly intergovernmental and similar to that 
of a classic international organization. The Council is composed of the foreign ministers of 
the 11 countries and of a representative of the European Commission, who meet every two 
years at a CBSS ministerial session. In addition, a Baltic Sea States Summit brings together 
the Heads of State of Government who are expected to provide overall political guidance.
 
There is an annual rotation of the CBSS presidency and, as with the EU system, a troika.
: the expression “forum” already indicates the 
pragmatic and anti-supranational approach that has been taken.  
59
                                                             
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 CBSS, “Innovative Cooperation for a Dynamic Region”, 2005, p.4 
59 Williams, op.cit., p.12 
 
Concerning the voting system, unanimity prevails, which results in all decisions being 20 
 
consensus-oriented and close to the lowest common denominator.
60 The few financial and 
human resources at the disposal of the CBSS also demonstrate the strongly intergovernmental 
flavour of this cooperation. In the first years following its creation, the CBSS worked without 
a secretariat of its own: the member states holding the presidency were in charge of all the 
administrative tasks.
61 A coordinating Secretariat was established in 1998 in Stockholm, but it 
remains quite small with only around fifteen staff members.
62 Regarding its financial 
resources, the Council does not have a general budget: the Secretariat is financed by annual 
contributions from the Member States, who are also responsible for seeking funds if they wish 
to finance further common activities.
63
This strongly intergovernmental functioning explains why the CBSS is mainly a forum 
for political dialogue or, one could critically say, for ‘declaratory politics’. This platform 
might have been quite useful in the 1990s to establish some level of trust between all these 
different countries. But the CBSS does not seem to live up to the current challenges and 
ambitions of the BSR. In June 2008 a reform was thus agreed by the Heads of State and 
Government at the 7
th Baltic Sea States Summit in Riga. The official aim of the reform is to 
“revitalize the CBSS to ensure that the organization is better equipped to focus on priority 
actions”
  
64 . Nevertheless, the reorganization is far from being ambitious and will not 
dramatically change the functioning of the CBSS. In fact, it is doubtful whether the CBSS will 
ever become a powerful organization able to take the lead and to be taken seriously by other 
actors. As an example, an official involved in BSR cooperation declared: “the CBSS is a very 
loose structure, which doesn’t have much credibility”
65
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The absence of a solid institutional framework obviously hampers the effectiveness of 
cooperation in the BSR. Nevertheless, the CBSS is far from illustrating the full reality of 
cooperation in the BSR. The existence of a plethora of cooperation fora and networks in the 
BSR exemplifies quite dynamic bottom-up forces. 
3.2. The large involvement of stakeholders 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, a revival of cooperation took place not only between 
states but first and foremost between actors from the civil society: contacts and partnerships 
were (re)established between NGOs, universities, cities, churches, political parties, etc, at a 
very fast speed. Some authors thus argue that the creation of the CBSS “might even have 
contained some pre-emptive purposes, i.e. the aim was one of not leaving the whole field 
merely to non-state actors”
66
According to some estimations, there are today around 70 networks that are active in 
the field of Baltic Sea cooperation and deal with specific issues.
.  
67
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 It is interesting to observe 
that the subnational level is involved to a great extent in this cooperation: one can mention in 
this regard the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC), the Union of Baltic 
Cities, the Baltic Metropoles Network, the Baltic Sea Seven Islands Cooperation Network (B7 
initiative) or the Baltic Sea Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of 
Europe (CPMR). In the field of economic development a lot of networks and fora are also 
active, such as the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce Association, the Baltic Business 
Advisory Council, the Baltic Sea Trade Union Network, the Baltic Ports Organizations, the 
Baltic Sea Tourism Commission, etc. Organizations dealing with environmental protection 
comprise the influential Helsinki Commission as well as the Baltic 21 project, whereas the 
Conference of Baltic University Rectors, the Baltic University Programme, the Baltic Sea 22 
 
Youth Office, etc, are active in the education policy field. These are just some examples of the 
most prominent organizations, but further interaction is taking place between less visible 
networks from civil society.
68
Nevertheless, it also entails the risk of fragmentation and incoherence. The CBSS is 
officially responsible for providing political guidance and overall coordination
 
This large involvement of stakeholders is a key strength and success factor of 
cooperation in the Region. This grassroots interest from various actors is a condition for its 
long-term viability. It means that cooperation is not only an elite-driven process which will 
disappear as soon as politicians lose incentives, but a reality deeply rooted in the civil society. 
It also provides a solid basis for the concrete implementation of projects because policy-
makers can rely on partners already collaborating with each other within well-established 
networks.  
69. Since 2001 
the CBSS has attempted to coordinate its activities with other regional organizations active in 
this field
70. For example, it has granted the status of ‘Special Participant’ to six regional 
organizations and identified other organizations as ‘Strategic Partners’. But as it was already 
argued, the CBSS is itself a very loose institution, its main concern being to avoid heavy 
bureaucratic structures. Consequently, the CBSS does not succeed in coordinating the work of 
all these organizations
71 and it results in a “loosely linked anarchy”
72
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. This is detrimental to 
the internal success of the cooperation. Given the large involvement of stakeholders there is a 
huge potential in the Region which is insufficiently exploited due to the weakness of the 
institutional framework. Resources could be pooled and used in a more efficient way if these 
multidimensional and mainly spontaneous initiatives could be streamlined and better 
69 http://www.cbss.st/thecouncil/ (22.03.09) 
70 ‘Innovative Cooperation for a Dynamic Region’, op.cit., p.16 
71 Williams, op.cit., p.13 
72 Ibid., p.22 23 
 
articulated. An observation which was primarily directed at innovation policy can be extended 
to cooperation in the BSR more generally: “so far it has been mostly a bottom-up approach. 
Cooperation is more based on coincidence than on a strategic thinking. What we now lack is 
a top-down approach and more coherence.”
73
4.  The involvement of the EU 
. 
The weaknesses of the BSR cooperation method and their impact on the cooperation’s 
effectiveness demonstrate that striking the right balance between a solid institutional 
framework and a dynamic involvement of stakeholders is a key success factor. After having 
examined three endogenous success factors, the paper will now move on to the assessment of 
an exogenous factor, i.e. the role played by the EU. 
 
In order to assess the importance of EU involvement, this section will draw on the case study 
of a macro-regional cooperation project conducted in the BSR in the field of  innovation 
policy and supported by the EU. It will first present the project (4.1) before assessing the role 
of the European Commission and of EU funding (4.2). 
4.1. The example of a successful macro-regional project, BSR Innonet 
The Baltic Sea Region Innovation Network (BSR Innonet) was one of the so-called 
‘INNONETs’ projects supported by the European Commission with the aim of fostering 
transnational cooperation in the field of innovation policy. It ran for three years (September 
2006 - August 2009) and involved representatives from national or regional ministries dealing 
with innovation policy, representatives from national innovation agencies and experts. BSR 
Innonet pursued two broad strategic objectives: “to establish a joint conceptual framework 
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for cluster policy formation, evaluation and operational activities across national borders in 
the BSR; to establish one or more joint innovation programmes among partner countries in 
the BSR”
74. Furthermore, it had the ambition to become a learning case for Europe
75. It had 
an overall budget of around €5 million for the 3 years: €2.4 million were provided by the 
Commission, while the rest was financed by national contributions and by external financial 
sources in the Region
76
Overall BSR Innonet is regarded as a success. Around 91% of the survey’s 
respondents
. 
77 assess the project as either “extremely valuable” (36%) or “rather valuable” 
(55%). This was confirmed by an official from the Commission: “The project was very 
successful in mobilizing different business and policy stakeholders to promote cluster 
development and cooperation in this region. This successful experience should now 
be integrated as an input into further cluster initiatives and relevant programmes”
78
Beyond the concrete results, one important aspect which is less directly visible but yet 
highly important is the socialization process taking place: “Over the 2 years participants have 
developed a higher degree of joint understanding: they are now well aware of the priorities of 
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 Indeed, around 82% of the respondents consider that their involvement in BSR 25 
 
Innonet has improved their understanding of the needs and priorities of their partner 
countries
80
The two questions that can be critically raised are whether this cooperation was 
launched purely to benefit from EU funds and whether the project would have anyway taken 
place also without EU funds. On the one hand, it must be emphasized that transnational 
cooperation in the Region had already been carried out before the creation of BSR Innonet. 
Indeed, two initiatives were launched a few years before. The first one was the creation in 
2004 of the Northern Dimension Working Group on Innovation by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers in order to explore and compare national innovation policies in the Region
.  
Against this background, it is interesting to analyze the role that the European 
Commission - and the financial resources it provided - have played both in the launch of and 
during the realization of this project.  
4.2. The catalyst role played by the European Commission and EU funding 
81. The 
same year, the Northern Cluster Alliance was launched by the Danish, Finish, Norwegian and 
Swedish innovation agencies: they invited all the other national innovation agencies of the 
Region to join the Alliance with a view to exchanging best practices on cluster policies
82. 
These two initiatives played a crucial role by paving the way for BSR Innonet. When the 
European Commission organized in 2005 its call for application, the Working Group and the 
Alliance agreed to join their forces
83
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: “Only a couple of weeks were then needed to respond to 26 
 
the call for application. We would never have been able to hand in a successful application 
without all this preparatory work.”
 84
The fact that cooperation already existed previously shows that the participation in this 
project was not exclusively motivated by the EU funds. Another indicator is that the financial 
effort was shared: Member States added to the EU funding their own national contributions. 
According to the project’s coordinator it is a critical factor for the success and the 




On the other hand, the call for application has played a very important role in the 
development towards a more ambitious and more structured level of cooperation: “The 
European Commission has been a very efficient trigger. Without this call for application we 
would have spent one or two more years to convince everybody before moving forward”
. 
86. 
Overall the coordinator of BSR Innonet describes the role of the European Commission as 
very positive: “The Commission has been a tremendous partner in the strategic dialogue. I 
have attended numerous meetings in Brussels to discuss how to move forward. I was also 
invited to go with Commission officials to conferences or workshops to present how to 
develop transnational cluster cooperation in Europe.”
87
                                                             





The answer to the two critical questions raised above is thus clearly negative. The 
Commission, through its call for application and its subsequent action, played the role of a 
facilitator by accelerating and guiding the development of cooperation within the BSR. This 




The four success factors examined in this paper prove to be of relevance, though to 
somewhat varying extents. Mere economic rationale will not be sufficient if it is not 
accompanied by the awareness among policy-makers that their countries have common 
interests which can be best pursued together rather than alone and if it is not accompanied by 
political leadership. Although a macro-regional cooperation process remains foremost 
functional and is mainly driven by interests, a certain level of collective identity is required in 
order, internally, to mediate between competing interests and, externally, to brand the Region 
to the outside world. From an institutional point of view a right balance has to be struck 
between a solid top-down framework and dynamic bottom-up forces. Finally, the European 
Commission can play a catalyst role by providing its expertise and its financial resources. The 
example of the BSR has shown that these factors interact with each other and can mutually 
compensate themselves: as an example, the damaging effects of a too loose institutional 
framework were partly offset by advice and funding from the EU in the case of BSR Innonet. 
In the future, it would be particularly interesting to apply the conceptual framework 
developed in this paper to other emerging macro-regions in Europe such as the Danube 
Region in order to assess the effectiveness of their cooperation and to identify room for 
improvement. 
This paper stands just at the beginning of what might be called a ‘macro-
regionalisation’ process. The EU has still to adapt its governance and its policies to the 
growing importance of macro-regions. “Till now there has always been a Europe with one 
speed with the concern to align everything, to make everything together. There might have 
been a rationale before. But cross-regions are taking the next step and they don’t do so 28 
 
instead of the EU, but in complement.”
88
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 The challenge of the next years will be to articulate 
these different geographic levels in an efficient and meaningful way both in financial and 
institutional terms so as to avoid overlapping and to foster synergies. According to the author, 
the subsidiarity test should now include a fourth level of governance. For each issue at stake, 
one should explore whether the micro-regional, the national, the macro-regional or the EU-
level (or a combination of those) is best able to address it. Moreover, the EU should 
financially support the macro-regions by strengthening the objective “Territorial Cooperation” 
of its regional policy. Currently this objective only benefits from 2.52% of the funds available 
for cohesion policy. A more balanced repartition between the three objectives in the next 
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